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Abstract 
 
Energy costs represent around 60-70% of operating costs of a ship and with the fuel price soaring to 
record levels, energy efficiency is once again becoming top of the agenda/priority for many shipping 
companies. Numerous cost effective energy efficient options/measures (technologies for new and 
existing ships and operations) have been identified for improving energy efficiency of ships. Analysis 
from industry leading experts and recognized bodies e.g. Faber et al. (2009), Buhaug et al. (2009), Det 
Norske Veritas (2009), IMO (2010), has so far shown substantial (e.g. up to 30%) unrealised 
abatement potential using options that often appear to be cost-negative at current fuel prices. Apart 
from the shortcomings of the analysis (e.g. risk representation, heterogeneity & hidden costs) failure 
to realise this potential (the energy efficiency gap) could be attributable to various market barriers and 
failures. This paper draws on findings of a survey conducted of shipping companies around the issue 
of barriers in shipping operations and analysis undertaken with the global shipping system model 
(GloTraM). These findings are used for the analysis of barriers and failures that have been discussed 
in other sectors and are analysed in the context of the shipping industry. 
 
1. Introduction & Background 
 
It is suggested that “low carbon shipping” describes a transition from the shipping industry’s current 
levels of emissions and emissions intensity, to lower levels. There is still only limited understanding 
of exactly what the extent of the transition would need to be and how it could be achieved, but to 
mitigate risks of dangerous climate change and to align with decarbonisation in other sectors of the 
economy, a reduction in absolute emissions relative to today’s by 30-80% is not inconceivable as a 
longer tem aim (Anderson and Bows, 2009). 
 
In light of that level of ambition, this paper aims to consider what barriers might prevent the 
implementation of such levels of decarbonisation in the shipping industry. The carbon emissions of 
the industry can be expressed as the product of transport demand and emissions intensity per unit of 
transport supply. For the purposes of this paper, we will assume that transport demand is out of scope 
as a ‘lever’ to reduce emissions. This paper will therefore concentrate on possible implementation 
barriers to efforts to lower the carbon intensity (including by lowering the energy intensity) of 
shipping as a system for the national and international transport of goods and people. 
 
1.1. Assessing the decarbonisation potential of a ship 
 
A key component of the shipping system is the individual ships. A number of options exist for either 
the increase of energy efficiency or the abatement of CO2 from ships. These can be either operational 
measures such as speed reduction, weather routing, etc. or technical measures such as waste heat 
recovery, air lubrication, etc. (IMO, 2010a) which can be applied to new build ships and in some 
cases also for retrofit to existing ships. A common method of presenting analysis of the order in which 
these options might be adopted and the likelihood of investment, particularly for policy work, is the 
Marginal Abatement Cost Curve (MACC). A MACC is a graph that indicates the marginal cost of 
emission abatement for varying amounts of emission reduction (Kesicki, 2010).  Examples of these 
for shipping can be found in Faber et al. (2009), Buhaug et al. (2009), IMO (2010), Det Norske 
Veritas (2009). Besides the inherent shortcomings in MACC analysis (Kesicki, 2010), for shipping it 
is commonly undertaken with an incomplete representation of costs and little representation of risk 
(beyond the investment rate of return). The result from the above referenced analyses has so far been 
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the identification of substantial (e.g. up to 30%) unrealised abatement potential using options that 
often appear to be cost-negative at current fuel prices. Possible explanations for why these options are 
not taken up or implemented are that either, models for analysis are inadequate for representing 
costs/benefits of low carbon and energy efficiency investment or the data used are incorrect (i.e. 
hidden costs, inadequate representation of risk); or other implementation barriers/failures exist which 
are obstructing the shipping industry’s implementation of low carbon such as informational problems, 
split incentives, access to and cost of capital.  
 
1.2. Defining barriers and the energy efficiency gap 
 
From the MACCs referenced earlier, it can be seen that there are some options that have a negative 
cost when implemented, meaning they are profitable (i.e. show a positive net present value) which 
would mean that the option will save money through reduced fuel expenditure over the investment 
horizon assumed in the modelling. This could be because the majority of these measures are 
operational measures, which require less capital outlay compared to technical measures featured on 
the right hand side of the curve. Furthermore these options are operational measures which could in 
theory also be implemented by charterers with long term time charters. The MACC however does not 
show current implementation rates of these options, hence there is a need to gauge the actual 
implementation rates of these within the industry and sectors. Thereafter there is a need to understand 
why some of these measures were implemented and why some had been not taken up, despite their 
apparent negative cost i.e. identifying the energy efficiency gap (refer to figure 1, see Blumstein et al., 
1980; Hirst and Brown, 1990; Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Sanstad and Howarth, 1994). To meet the 
above needs a survey of shipping companies was conducted, details of which will be discussed in the 
later sections.  
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Figure 1. The energy efficiency gap. 
 
A barrier may be defined as a postulated mechanism that inhibits investment in technologies that are 
both energy efficient and economically efficient (Sorrel et al., 2004). It has been argued that the 
energy efficiency gap exists due to barriers to energy efficiency (Sorrel et al, 2000; Thollander et al, 
2010 etc.). These barriers have been broadly categorised as economic, behavioural and organisational 
(refer to figure 2) and in practice this typology is not exclusive; each barrier will have economic, 
behavioural and organisational aspects (Weber, 1997). The focus of this paper is mainly on economic 
barriers to energy efficiency. Economic barriers to energy efficiency stem from neo-classical 
economics, which assume individuals and organisations as rational and utility/profit maximising. This 
approach has been prone to criticism of being unrealistic of actual behaviour (Hodgson, 1988), 
however it is the most developed and applied approach to understanding the barriers to energy 
efficiency. Thus, it is possible to gain some insight into the relative significance of economic barriers 
in shipping, by looking at how this work has been discussed by others in various industries.  
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Figure 2. Classification of barriers. 
 
2. Barriers literature in shipping 
 
This section of the paper focuses on economic barriers that are inhibiting the uptake of cost-negative 
measures in shipping. AEA (2007, 2008), Gordon (2008), Faber et al. (2009), Wang et al. (2010), Hill 
(2010), Faber et al. (2011), Rehmatulla (2011), Heisman & Tomkins (2011) have discussed in 
different contexts barriers to implementation of abatement options in shipping. 
 
2.1. Non market failures 
 
As shown above, some of the energy efficiency gap can be explained by rational behaviour. These are 
real features of the decision making environment, albeit ones which are difficult to incorporate in 
engineering-economic modelling e.g. MACC (Sorrel et al, 2000). These factors are heterogeneity, 
hidden costs and risk. 
 
2.1.1. Heterogeneity 
 
Although a technology may be cost-effective on average for a class of users taken in aggregate, the 
class (e.g. panaxmax container ships, specific routes, commodities), itself, consists of a distribution of 
owners/operators: some could economically purchase additional efficiency, while others will find the 
new level of efficiency not cost effective (Sweeney, 1993). This will result in overstating the 
opportunities for a particular option in a particular sector. Wang et al. (2010) in their MACC analysis 
report that the cost effectiveness and CO2 emission reduction potential for each option varies widely 
as a function of ship type, size and age, for example, the potential for emission reduction through 
speed reductions for containerships is much greater compared to tankers and bulkers which are 
relatively slower moving vessels. 
 
2.1.2. Risk 
 
The energy efficiency gap could be as a result of a rational response to risk. According to Sorrel (2000) 
risk has three dimensions in context of energy efficiency: 
 External risk – overall economic trends, fuel price, policy and regulation. This is highly 
representative of what is being faced by shipping companies especially the latter two. Fuel costs 
are paramount in the industry and its expectation can shape the investment in energy efficiency. It 
is important to note how the industry copes with its uncertainty. Faber et al. (2009) show that 
almost 70% - 90% of the fuel costs are passed on. Future EEDI and MBM for regulation 
uncertainty. 
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 Business risk – financing risk and sectoral trends. A major focus for the shipowner is the 
financing costs of a ship and its repayment (Stopford, 2009). For some shipping markets there are 
risks that are intertemporal such as development of emission control area (ECA’s), use of liquid 
natural gas (LNG) etc.  
 Technical risk – technical performance and unreliability. Technologies are assumed incorrectly to 
be mature or a risk is perceived that performance may be lower than expected - risk premiums and 
depreciation are not adequately included in the model. Early investors may be sceptical about the 
prospects of a technology and demand a premium on return in order to cover the risks of the 
investment (Faber et al., 2009). When commissioning new builds, if depreciation is faster than 
expected, due to the adoption of technology (diffusion), which lower costs due to the learning 
curve, the solvency of the company may be threatened (Faber et al., 2009). So in some cases a 
ship owner commissioning a new ship would have to compare the risk of having a ship with an 
innovative design that may depreciate faster than expected with the risk of having a ship with a 
conventional design but higher operational costs. In such an assessment, the most fuel efficient 
ship may not always come out best. The same can be said for retrofit technologies as well. All of 
the above dimensions of risks faced by a business can therefore lead to stringent investment 
criteria, such as high levels of internal rate of return (IRR) and very short payback periods. In 
shipping the payback periods tend to be very short (Lloyds List, 2011a) despite the average age of 
a ship being around 25 years.  
 
2.1.3 Hidden costs  
 
Hidden costs are costs that are hidden to the analyst but not the investing company, resulting in 
overestimation of the efficiency potential and for shipping perhaps the most cited argument for the 
efficiency gap. The following costs may not have been included in the MACC for shipping: 
 Life cycle costs – hidden costs relating to the energy efficient option’s life cycle costs including: 
identification/search costs, project appraisal costs, commissioning costs, disruption/opportunity 
costs and additional/specific engineering costs. 
 Transactional costs – transaction costs and other unobserved cost items may render apparently 
cost-effective measures costly. Especially smaller ship owners and operators may experience high 
transaction costs as they cannot spread the costs of e.g. gathering information over a large number 
of ships (Faber et al., 2009) 
 Commissioning/disruption costs – some measures to reduce emissions require retrofits that can 
only be installed by temporarily suspending operation. These measures are very costly to 
implement except at times when operations are halted for other reasons, such as major survey or 
periodical drydocking. There may therefore be a lag between the time when a measure becomes 
available and its actual implementation. Retrofits to existing ships such as the installation of wind 
power, stern flaps, waste heat recovery systems etc. can only be done cost-effectively when a ship 
undergoes a major overhaul. This causes a time-lag of several years in the implementation of cost 
effective measures. 
 Loss of benefits – reduction in benefits associated with energy efficient options (Nichols, 1994), 
such as problems with safety, extra maintenance, reliability and service quality. Example of this 
in shipping are speed reduction and safety, exhaust gas scrubber’s reliability and extra 
maintenance, etc.  
 
2.1.4 Access and costs of capital 
 
Restricted access to capital markets is often considered to be an important barrier to investing in 
energy efficiency. That is, investments may not be profitable because companies face a high price for 
capital. As a result, only investments yielding an expected return that exceeds this (high) hurdle rate 
will be realised (Schleich & Grubber, 2008). Capital rationing is often used within firms as an 
allocation means for investments, leading to hurdle rates that are much higher than the cost of capital, 
especially for small projects (Ross, 1986). This leads to competition between projects within a 
company and may lead to low priority given to energy efficiency. “If improving energy efficiency 
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comes at the cost of forgoing other more cost-effective opportunities (because of capital or labour 
constraints or because the projects are mutually exclusive alternatives), it would be rational for the 
firm to give energy efficiency a low priority” (Faber et al., 2009). 
 
If the above rational responses can be incorporated and accurately represented in models and still 
show existence of apparent cost-negative options that were not being employed, it could then be 
concluded that additional implementation barriers existed. One could then say that there is a gap 
between the potential reduction achievable and current state, which could be explained by market 
failures.  
 
2.2. Market failures 
 
A market failure occurs when the requirements for efficient or optimal allocation of resources through 
well-functioning markets are violated, which leads to incomplete markets, imperfect competition, 
imperfect and asymmetric information. The latter two are more important and relevant in context of 
explaining the energy efficiency gap (Sorrel, 2004).  
 
2.2.1. Informational problems  
 
Informational problems taking different forms are the principal source of market failures that account 
for the energy efficiency gap (Huntington et al, 1994). According to Golove & Eto (1996) this falls 
into three categories; lack of information, cost of obtaining information and accuracy of information. 
These could occur because information has a public good attribute leading to information being under 
supplied or those who have information have strategic reasons to manipulate it in order to inflate its 
value. This is very relevant to the barriers faced by shipping companies. Generally the MACC 
modelling in shipping utilises manufacturer data on costs and savings that may be biased/optimistic 
e.g. Wang et al. (2010) use data derived from an engine manufacturer’s brochure. Faber et al. (2011) 
showed that respondents cited lack of trusted data on measures from an independent third party as an 
important barrier to implementation. Several initiatives have begun to bring more information, create 
transparency and decrease the information asymmetry between charterers and shipowners, suppliers 
and buyers, examples of which include Carbon War Rooms shipping efficiency index and Fathom 
shipping’s Ctech website. Stern and Aronson (1984) argue that even when provided with information 
(via labelling) establishing the cost effectiveness of such purchases, consumers are wary and 
mistrustful because of past experience with advertised misinformation. Faber et al. (2009, 2011) and 
Wang et al. (2010) suggest that even the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) will allow for 
gaming, and as such may not remove the information barrier.   
 
2.2.2. Split incentives/principal-agent problems 
 
These problems refer to the potential difficulties that arise when two parties engaged in a contract 
have different goals and different levels of information (IEA, 2007). One example is misplaced or 
split incentives which occur when the costs and benefits of energy efficiency accrue to different 
agents (Blumstein, 1980; Fisher & Rothkopf, 1989). In shipping, split incentives are likely to occur 
due to the different types of charter (and the divided responsibility for fuel costs) existing between 
shipowners and charterers (Wang et al, 2010, Rehmatulla (2011). Ship owners who invest in fuel 
efficiency improving measures cannot, in general, recoup their investment, unless they operate their 
own ships or have long term agreements with charterers and also because neither charter rates nor 
second hand prices of ships reflect the economic benefit of its fuel efficiency due to informational 
problems (Faber et al, 2009, 2011; Lloyds list, 2011b). The shipowner may have relevant information 
on the costs and benefits of an energy efficiency investment, but may also find it difficult to convey to 
the other party (Jaffe & Stavins, 1994). If there were no informational problems and incentives were 
aligned then the parties would be able to enter into contracts to share the costs and benefits of the 
investment. However sometimes this may be outweighed by the transaction costs involved hence 
investment is likely to be forgone despite potential advantages to both parties (Sorrell et al., 2004).  
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3. Summary of existing research and a problem statement 
 
The existing literature therefore reveals two key findings: 
 Market barriers and failures, particularly the concept of an efficiency gap, appear to be a common 
feature of a number of markets which could be considered to be similar to shipping. 
 There are indications that the specific structure of the shipping markets could be susceptible to 
market barriers, but to date there has been little work to quantify the consequence of any failures 
and to test rigorously for their existence. 
 
Therefore, to develop the knowledge of shipping’s low carbon implementation barriers beyond the 
existing literature, this paper will first examine how different investment parameters might affect the 
uptake of energy efficiency technology, and then use the results of a survey of shipping stakeholders 
to investigate the levels of uptake of low carbon initiatives. The results will also be used to discuss 
differences in uptake between sectors of the shipping markets and to hypothesise about what this 
might tell us about the incidence of some of the classical market barriers and failures. 
 
4. GloTraM modelling of barriers to low carbon shipping 
 
GloTraM is a model of the shipping system that can be used to estimate the take-up of different 
technologies and the consequence that these would have on the emissions from the shipping industry. 
A general overview of the model’s components can be found in Smith et al. (2011), greater detail on 
technology modelling can be found in Calleya et al. (2011).  
 
The model uses a techno-economic evaluation of a range of different technologies to identify the 
specification of newbuild ships, the potential for any retrofits and the consequences of these changes 
to the global fleet of ships to the annual fuel consumption, emissions and costs of shipping. The 
techno-economic evaluation includes a number of assumptions that represent the extent of some of the 
barriers discussed above. Therefore the model can be used to explore the consequence of some of the 
classical barriers to the technical specification of ships and the emissions from the sector. Those 
barriers include: 
 Access to capital, as represented by the return on investment period and the WACC (weighted 
average cost of capital) 
 Time window to recoup savings. or return period for investment 
 The principle-agent problem, represented by the proportion of cost-saving associated with fuel-
saving, that is passed from the charterer to the owner 
 
4.1. Investment appraisal method 
 
It is not possible to explain all the detail in this paper so only detail on the evaluation of the economic 
benefit of an intervention is described here. For the example analysed here, it is assumed that there are 
two stakeholders, one (A) who bears the capital and operating costs of the ship and another (B) who 
bears the voyage (fuel) costs. This could be considered to be typical of a time-charter arrangement but 
may also be present in the stakeholder chain behind a voyage charter. 
 
If everything else remains constant, the consequence of an investment in energy efficiency (or low 
carbon) technology is an increase in A’s costs (higher capital and maintenance costs), and a decrease 
in B’s costs (lower fuel costs). The extent to which this cost saving is passed from B to A is a 
representation of the extent of a market barrier associated with this principle agent problem and a key 
determinant of the investment strategy that A should apply in order to maximise their profits. The cost 
pass through is quantified in a factor in GloTraM that takes a value between 0 and 1. If the latter, the 
entire cost-saving is passed from B to A, if 0.5 then 50% of the saving is passed from B to A and 50% 
retained as B's profit and if 0, 100% is retained as B's profit.  
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4.2. Run specifications 
 
For the purpose of investigating the sensitivity of low carbon shipping to a variety of market barriers, 
five runs of the model were performed during the period 2010-2025. The following scenario details 
were held constant for all runs: 
 EEDI regulation 
 Compliance with SOx, NOx and ballast water regulations as per IMO MARPOL Annex VI 
regulations for global limits, no application of ECA regulation. 
 No MBM, carbon price etc. 
 IEO reference oil price used to derive fuel prices 
 Long-run averages for time-charter prices, held constant in time  
 Main engine and fuel choice limited to conventional diesel engines, heavy fuel oil and marine 
diesel oil. 
 Technology performance and cost data, as described in Day (2012). 
 
In all instances, the design speed was held constant and the operating speed of the ship was matched 
to the design speed. Whilst it is recognised that this may not be reflective of all of the flexibility 
owners have in choosing the design speed of a ship and that operators have in choosing voyage speeds, 
these were held constant to control the scenario experiment. The results are therefore a comparison of, 
ceteris paribus, levels of technology uptake as a function of some key investment parameters.  
  
The investment parameters that were varied and their specifications were as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Values for the investment parameters used in scenarios A to E. 
Run Cost savings pass 
through from operator 
to owner / % 
WACC for owner / % Return on investment 
period for owner / 
years 
A 100 10 3 
B 100 10 20 
C 100 2 20 
D 50 10 3 
E 25 10 3 
 
There is no publicly available data listing the combination of these investment parameters that best 
represents different owners and operators in the shipping industry. The values chosen were chosen so 
that they spanned some of the likely values. Perhaps scenario D could be suggested to be closest to 
reality for operators of ocean going merchant shipping, but all the parameters are likely to vary 
significantly between firms and the specifics of the contract(s) under which the ship is being operated. 
Therefore, these should not be considered as definitive of the range of parameters used in the sector, 
but illustrators of sensitivity. 
 
4.3. Results 
 
The results from the runs specified in Table 1 can be seen in Figure 3. Only two examples are 
presented, corresponding to a large tanker (VLCC) and a large containership. The results presented 
show the model estimated forecast of the attained EEDI by newbuild designs from 2010 to 2025. The 
trends are approximately similar for all ship sizes, but because of variations in revenue, capital costs, 
operating costs and performance and cost data between ships of different size and type, the results are 
not exactly the same. In all cases, the upper limit of the EEDI trajectories is represented by the EEDI 
regulation’s required EEDI value in each of the years (it progresses from 10% baseline reduction in 
2015 to 30% baseline reduction in 2025). The constraints on design speed and machinery 
specification mean that the only source of energy efficiency improvement is technology. The range of 
technology options available are not all compatible with each other and the maximum feasible 
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improvement of EEDI is 40%. This sets a lower bound on the curves, which is reached in both 
instances in 2015 for the most favourable investment parameter scenario. 
 
Scenario D (estimated to be BAU) is shown to follow the required EEDI values closely for both the 
ship types studied. There is little discrepancy between E and D – perhaps more would be seen if the 
constraint on achieving a maximum EEDI were relaxed. Scenario A shows a significant departure to 
D and E for the case of the container ship, but the greatest discrepancy is shown when the return on 
investment period is significantly extended. There is little discrepancy between scenarios B and C 
which differentiate from each other solely on cost of capital. That discrepancy is more marked in the 
instance of tankers, which is consistent with the general trend in the results that imply that in A,B and 
C, a greater amount of decarbonisation is achievable for the containership than the tanker given the 
same set of investment parameters. 
  
 
Figure 3. Results from scenario runs for newbuild EEDI in each year. 
 
5. Results from Survey 
 
A survey was used to assess the uptake of a number of cost-effective/cost negative and energy 
efficient operational measures within the shipping industry. The survey was able to provide a general 
indication of what measures are implemented in each of the shipping sectors and shed light on why 
some measures were not undertaken or seemed unattractive for investment (Rehmatulla, 2012).  
 
5.1. Survey design 
 
The unit of analysis/target population were global shipping companies with more than 5 ships which 
consisted of shipowners, ship owner-operators, ship management company & shipping division major 
charterers/cargo owners in the wetbulk, drybulk & container sectors only. These were recruited from 
Clarksons Shipping Information Network (SIN) database of shipowners. It is believed that this is the 
most comprehensive list of the target population. However, upon comparison with other online 
databases such as World Shipping Directory slight under coverage of companies was noted. Effort 
was made to merge the frames to cover accurately the target population. A stratified sampling 
approach was taken so as to represent the different variables of interest to the survey. A company with 
90% of its fleet belonging to a sector would be placed in the respective sector category and when the 
fleet composition falls below 90% for one sector, the company is placed under the mixed sector. The 
total number of companies that responded was 170, which consisted of 120 almost complete (90% 
item response) responses and 50 partially completed responses, making the response rate for large and 
medium companies just over  15% (90/600) (80% of total stratified sample required) and 50% of the 
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sample required for small companies. In order to be representative and to make generalisations i.e. 
reach statistically overall significant results with a confidence level of 90% and margin of error 
interval of +/-15% or +/-20%, each stratum required a minimum number of responses, presented in 
Rehmatulla (2012). Due to a level of non-response there may be a presence of systematic biases (i.e. 
those who responded are significantly unlike those who failed to. However because of scarcity of 
information on this subject area, even such low response rate may be able to provide useful 
information, hence the decision to publish the results as is, without any weightings and inferences to 
the population. 
 
5.2. Implementation of measures 
 
Respondents were first asked to select the top five operational measures that they believe have the 
highest potential in reducing fuel consumption. Fuel consumption monitoring, general speed reduction 
and weather routing were cited as measures that have the highest potential. The follow up question 
asked whether they have considered/implemented the measure they believed had the highest potential. 
From figure 4 it can be seen that even measures that were cited as having the highest potential have 
actual implementation rate of around 70%. On average across all the measures the implementation 
rate is around 50%. This clearly shows that despite the negative costs, ease of implementation and 
short payback period of most operational measures (Wang et al., 2010), some measures still do not see 
90-100% implementation. Many MACC studies assume that measures with negative costs would have 
been fully implemented or would have been or will be implemented under a certain fuel price. How 
much of this gap between the potential and actual be explained by rational responses & market 
failures? 
  
 
Figure 4. Implementation of operational measures believed to have highest potential. 
 
5.3. non market failures 
 
Some of the gap in the implementation could be explained by rational behaviour of the firms as 
explained in section 2.1. We apply the concept of heterogeneity (a particular technology may be cost 
effective on average, but not in all cases) and see how size of the firm and the sector it operates in 
affects the implementation of measures. There was found to be a difference between the overall 
implementation rates for each of the sectors, however zero order (without controlling other variables) 
bivariate relationships (crosstabulations/chi-square) between each measure’s implementation and its 
association with a sector showed that in general there was some relationship between the two. 
Multivariate regression analysis shows that neither of the variables (sector and size) are good at 
explaining the implementation of the measures.  
 
n = 165 
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Table 2. Results from the statistical testing of homogeneity in the survey respondents. 
Measure Sector   Size   Multivariate analysis 
  
Phi/Cramers 
V Significance Phi/Cramers V Significance R
2
 Significance 
Weather Routing 0.305 0.151 0.117 0.557 0.1 0.3 
General speed 
reduction 0.283 0.24 0.178 0.266 0.11 0.25 
Fuel consumption 
monitoring 0.213 0.536 0.189 0.208 0.08 0.45 
 
Hidden costs, access to capital and risk perception are also cogent reasons for why some shipping 
companies do not implement measures and these can be easily misrepresented in techno-economic 
modelling approaches, resulting in overestimation of savings potential. The respondents were asked 
why they believed the measures they had not selected initially had lower potential for fuel savings. 
Lack of access to capital and additional costs related to the measures fared very low in the responses 
to this question (Rehmatulla, 2012), although, lack of access to capital and additional costs had 
perfectly negative correlation with size of the company.  
 
5.4. Market failures 
 
In general the most pertinent barrier across all measures that were not selected (i.e. seemed to have 
lower fuel saving potential) were lack of reliable information on cost and savings, difficultly in 
implementing under some types of charter, lack of direct control over operations & materiality of 
savings, i.e. measures may be ignored by decision-makers due to their limited impact (AEA, 2008) 
(these, represented on average 50% of barriers cited for any given measure). Analysing this in greater 
detail, it can be seen that there were specific barriers for each of the measures. Lack or reliable 
information on cost and savings affects the potential for weather routing, autopilot adjustment, 
trim/draft optimisation and raising crew awareness & training. Weather routing and autopilot 
adjustment are mature technologies (Wang et al., 2010) for which it would be expected that such 
information is readily and reliably available. For a breakdown of most cited barriers per measure refer 
to Rehmatulla (2012). There wasn’t a clear relationship between informational problems cited and 
size of companies. For the survey, indicators of split incentives market failure were; the chartering 
ratio of the company, which asked respondents the % of the fleet that is owned, chartered in and out 
under the different types of charter and perception of the barrier which had three categories; savings 
cannot be fully recouped, difficult to implement under some types of charter and lack of direct control 
over operations. Companies were divided into six groups to reflect company structure and chartering 
ratio e.g. group 1 is a company that owns majority (>50%) of the fleet and charters out majority 
(>50%) of the fleet in spot market. Controlling for sector results in much larger effect size but at the 
same time significance values increase, because of smaller sample after controlling, e.g. general speed 
reduction and group correlation is 0.627 almost doubling after controlling for sector with p value 
of .215. The table below only shows zero order relationships between implementation of measures 
and group. 
 
Table 4. Results of correlation by group of different operational measures  
Measure Group   Multivariate analysis 
  Phi/Cramers V Significance R
2
 Significance 
Weather Routing .287 .394 .08 .42 
General speed 
reduction .363 .154 .13 .15 
Fuel consumption 
monitoring .284 .369 .08 .38 
Raising crew 
awareness .485 .086 .23 .08 
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5.5. Barriers to onboard energy efficiency: Crew training 
 
The discussion above has been focused on the measures that can reduce CO2 emissions. However, it is 
important to look at the whole shipping system and this includes understanding how the ship is 
actually operated and whether this may increase or decrease the potential of CO2 reduction measures. 
In an article in sustainable shipping, Germany-based SkySails said winning support from ships' crews 
is crucial in developing towing kites as a tool to cut bunker consumption. "One of our main goals now 
is to have the system accepted by the crews” (Sustainable Shipping, 2011), highlighting the 
importance of crew in delivering the required fuel savings. To that end, a survey was developed to 
quantify the need for energy efficiency crew training schemes and to support the development of a 
low carbon strategy for shipping (Banks, 2011). Over 300 responses were collected from six groups of 
crews such as companies engaged in shipping and training. The results show that the crew are 
generally aware of the CO2 dimension in shipping with 76% responding that they were aware of the 
effects of CO2 emissions, however very little of this knowledge was gained through maritime 
education and training. It was acknowledged by the respondents that there was a good scope of 
reducing CO2 emissions by making changes to onboard crewing processes, such as through creation 
of incentive structures, focussed guidelines, etc. In shipping, under the time charter where fuel is paid 
by the charterer, there is no direct control over the use of fuel as crewing/manning is on the account of 
the shipowner, which may result in split incentives and moral hazards (actions of crew unobservable 
to the charterer). Almost half of the respondents have made little or no effort to make improvement to 
energy efficiency. To address this, some companies have already begun incentivising crews by paying 
bonuses based on fuel savings (Sustainable Shipping, 2012). Over half of the respondents supported 
the notion that a reward scheme would affect the effort they make for energy efficiency improvements. 
From the previous survey analysis, it can be seen that raising crew awareness had a strong relationship 
with the chartering group and that the chartering group explained almost a quarter of the level of 
implementation (R
2
), both the results being almost significant, implying split incentives are 
significantly affecting crew energy efficiency training. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper attempts to take a broad perspective on the subject of the implementation barriers that 
could impede shipping’s transition to a lower carbon modus operandi. Given the extensive evidence 
for an efficiency gap that is presented for other sectors of the economy (Sections 1 and 2), it seems 
hard to imagine that a gap is not also present in the shipping industry. Indeed the results of the survey 
presented in Section 5 show implementation of around 70% of measures with high fuel saving 
potential and an average implementation rate across all the operational measures examined to be 50%, 
under the assumption that 100% of the operational measures could be considered by classical analysis 
to be termed “cost-effective” this supports the hypothesis that an efficiency gap might exist for 
shipping too. 
 
In order address the question: if an efficiency gap exists, what might its significance be? a study was 
undertaken using GloTraM. This quantified the energy efficiency of newbuild ships over the period 
2010 to 2025 under a range of assumptions for the investment parameters used as input parameters to 
the model. The study showed that under certain investment circumstances, a maximum impact on 
energy efficiency (in this instance a reduction of EEDI by approximately 40%) could be reached in 
2015, whereas with several of the range of scenarios considered the newbuild’s energy efficiency 
would be ‘pegged’ to the level defined in the EEDI reduction trajectories. 
 
Given the evidence for the existence of an efficiency gap, the next challenge is to estimate which 
market barriers or failures might be most likely to be responsible. Detailed analysis of the survey data 
can provide some insight to this. The fact that a greater implementation percentage is attributable to 
the measures perceived to have the highest fuel saving implies either that agents were behaving 
rationally or that there may be barriers that result in the lack of uptake (i.e. it appears to refute the 
hypothesis that there are modelling artefacts that exist that have not been taken into account).  
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The statistical analysis found that non market failures (mainly heterogeneity & access/cost of capital) 
were not obvious explanations for the patterns of uptake of individual operational measures for the 
population studied, however extrapolating this conclusion to the whole fleet could not be fully 
justified due to the size of the sample. On the other hand, market failures (mainly split incentives 
through grouping by chartering ratio) were found to be correlated to the implementation of individual 
measures, which supports the hypothesis that they are a plausible explanation for the efficiency gap. 
The survey of onboard energy efficiency appears to further support the hypothesis that a significant 
principal-agent/split incentive market failure exists, as over half the survey respondents had made 
little or no effort to improve energy efficiency.  
 
Further work is clearly beneficial in a number of areas. GloTraM could be used to consider the retrofit 
as well as the newbuild sectors of the shipping industry. Results from such analysis could then be 
combined in order to explore the impacts of different levels of market barriers on the emissions of the 
sector and not just the specifications of the fleet. The survey that has been conducted to understand 
the implementation scale and behaviours around operational measures could be extended to include 
technical measures and could also be increased in its sample size. 
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